




**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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# **National Intelligence Daily**

***Tuesday  
13 July 1982***

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CHAD: Tenuous Prospects for Stability

*President Habre is continuing efforts to achieve national reconciliation amid signs of Libyan plans to create new turmoil.*

Western press reports say Habre met on Saturday in Gabon with southern Chadian strongman Kamougue to discuss plans for a regionally balanced coalition government in which the south would play a key role. French President Mitterrand's chief African affairs adviser participated in the talks.

Comment: One month after seizing power, Habre has made progress toward mending fences with the Christian and animist south and with the northern Muslim factions that supported former President Goukouni. The current peace, however, could easily be undermined by new outbreaks of factional strife.

France evidently is working closely with Habre to encourage Kamougue and other factional leaders to join the government. French officials for the most part see Habre as a more moderate and effective leader than his predecessor, and Paris is likely to provide reconstruction aid and perhaps some budgetary assistance to strengthen his grip on power.

The Libyans fear Chad under Habre may become a staging ground for Western-backed efforts to overthrow the Qadhafi regime. Tripoli probably will continue behind-the-scenes efforts to devise a pro-Libyan change of power in N'Djamena or at least to foment serious new unrest to keep Habre off balance.

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## SPECIAL ANALYSIS

(14)

## ISRAEL: Political Prospects in the West Bank and Gaza

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1 Israel has accelerated efforts to foster a pliable Arab leadership in the West Bank and Gaza since the invasion of Lebanon, and  
 2 Tel Aviv apparently is now ready to move ahead with the installation of more responsive local Arabs into key municipal posts. There is widespread opposition to the Israeli efforts and, despite the calm that has prevailed in the area over the past month, more violence is likely. West Bank and Gaza Arabs probably are not capable of sustained resistance, however, because they are poorly organized and constrained by tough Israeli security policies.

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1 Defense Minister Sharon has long held that the destruction of the PLO's political and military infrastructure in Lebanon would free Arab moderates in the West Bank and Gaza from PLO intimidation. They would  
 2 then step forward, he has argued, and join the autonomy negotiations. Since the invasion, Sharon has increased his efforts to encourage such participation.

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1 A major part of these efforts has been aimed at strengthening the Israeli-backed Village Leagues. A new league was created last week in Nablus, bringing to seven  
 2 the number of such organizations now in place in the West Bank. A Village League newspaper has begun to circulate, apparently with Israeli backing, and league officials have been given additional administrative and commercial powers.

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1 Three additional mayors and municipal councils have been removed, raising to eight the number of such removals since early this year. The nationalist leadership of the West Bank and Gaza--including most of the municipal officials elected on pro-PLO tickets in 1976--has now been  
 2 effectively dismantled.

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Setting the Stage for Autonomy

1/2 The decision to remove Mayor Shawwa of Gaza, a longtime moderate who has been on generally good terms with the Israelis, apparently indicates Tel Aviv has abandoned any effort to lure established Arab moderates into the negotiating process. Instead, the Israelis apparently intend to base their West Bank and Gaza policy solely on the Israeli-created leadership of the Village Leagues. [ ]

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1/2 The Israelis expect these men to endorse the narrow Israeli concept of autonomy. They may want them to form the basis for the Self-Governing Authority called for in the Camp David accords. [ ]

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1/2 Pressure from Israeli hardliners to take advantage of the PLO's defeat in Lebanon by pushing Israeli-backed people into key municipal posts is growing. Moreover, sentiment for "imposed" autonomy is likely to increase now that two members of the defunct TELEM Party, which favored such a move, have joined the government. [ ]

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Arab Reaction

1/2 Almost all West Bank and Gaza Arabs continue to reject the Israeli interpretation of autonomy and will resist Tel Aviv's efforts to strengthen the Village Leagues and pro-Israeli Arabs. Some violence between Village League members and PLO sympathizers has already occurred. [ ]

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1/2 West Bank and Gaza Arabs opposed to Israeli policy are poorly organized, however, and have been badly hurt by tough Israeli security measures. The removal of

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traditional nationalist leaders such as Mayor Shakka of Nablus, who was ousted and placed under house arrest in March, has weakened resistance. Shakka's efforts to organize a general strike to protest the invasion met with little success because he was unable to use his municipal position to gather support. [ ]

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4 Moreover, the lack of Arab support for the PLO also has cut into nationalist sentiment. The mild Arab reaction has shocked political activists and led to a general atmosphere of resignation and despair. [ ]

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1 2 The Israelis' inclination to tolerate excessive behavior by Village League members, many of whom have been armed by the Israelis, has encouraged them to use violence to settle old scores and intimidate their opponents. The increasing assumption of traditional municipal administrative powers by the Village Leagues also has forced many West Bankers to accommodate themselves to the leagues' leaders, further undercutting opposition to Israeli policies. [ ]

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